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This paper is based on a structural model of retirement and saving, estimated with data 
for a sample of married men in the Health and Retirement Study.  The model simulates 
how various features of a system of personal Social Security accounts jointly affects 
retirement, saving, the choice of whether benefits are taken as an annuity or lump sum, 
taxes paid and the course of benefits with age.  Among our findings: Under a system of 
partial personal accounts, the fraction of 62 year olds at full time work would decline by 
about 22 percent compared to retirements under the current benefit formula.  If the 
current system were replaced completely by personal accounts, the fraction at full time 
work would decline by about a third.  If all benefits from personal accounts could be 
taken as a lump sum, the fraction not retired at age 62 would fall by about 5 percentage 
points compared to a system where there is mandatory annuitization of benefits.  Unless 
annuitization is mandatory, there would be substantial diversion of benefits to age 62, 







An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 7th Annual Joint Conference of the 
Retirement Research Consortium, “Towards a Secure Retirement System,” August 11-12, 
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This paper investigates how introducing personal accounts into a program of Social 
Security reform is likely to affect retirement, saving, lump sum payouts and the course of 
benefits with age, taxes and related outcomes.  We use a structural model of retirement and 
saving to estimate the likely effects of design features adopted by different proposals on 
outcomes of interest.  The interplay between the income effect of personal accounts, the 
additional crediting of benefits for work at older ages created by the accounts, the demand for 
liquidity and role of time preference in determining the timing of the cash out decision for 
personal accounts, all create links to the timing of the retirement decision, and to the flow of 
benefits and taxes.   
Three important design features are considered –whether participation in personal 
accounts is voluntary or mandatory; whether the accounts partially or fully replace the current 
benefit system; and whether lump sum payouts are permitted, or benefits must be annuitized.   
Alternative approaches to these and other design features differentiate the proposals by President 
Bush’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security from earlier proposals, such as those 
contained in a series of papers by Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick (1998a, 1998b, 2001).  
The choice of annuitizing benefits or taking them partially or fully as a lump sum is a crucial 
design feature that has not received much attention in earlier studies, but is a significant 
determinant of the course of benefits throughout retirement.  
Section II estimates the structural model of retirement and saving that underlies our 
analysis.  Section III uses the model to examine the effects of alternative proposals that the 
introduction of carve out personal accounts will have on the course of retirement, participation in 
personal accounts, whether benefits from personal accounts are taken in the form of lump sums 
or annuities, and the flow of retirement benefits and taxes.  Section IV concludes.   
II. A Structural Retirement Model of Retirement and Saving. 
The model estimated here jointly explains retirement and saving, allowing for 
heterogeneity in time preference and tastes for leisure.  In the basic model, the individual is 
assumed to maximize a utility function of consumption and leisure over time:  
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Here,  C  is consumption and  L  is the utility value of leisure.  t  indexes time over the 
individual’s adult life, and  ρ  is the time preference rate.  m indexes three survival states for a 
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married individual: both spouses are alive; only the respondent is alive; or only the spouse is 
alive.  sm,t  is the probability that the couple is in the survival state denoted by m at time t. 
 The relative value of leisure at time t is represented by the term ht, where ht is given by   
h et
Xt= +β ε
.   
 Xt  contains a constant, an age variable, an indicator of poor health, and the birth year.  The age 
variable increases the value of leisure smoothly over time as work becomes less attractive with 
age.  As the value of leisure increases, at some point it surpasses the utility of the consumption 
that continued work makes possible, and the individual retires.  It is important to note that the 
effects of age are gradual, and that unlike many models of retirement, in this model there are no 
terms in the preference function which would make retirement suddenly more desirable at 
specific ages such as 62 or 65.  The parameter  ε  in the expression for  ht  varies among 
individuals and reflects the fact that some individuals give leisure more weight than others.  It is 
presumed to come from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation σε.  
 Individuals working more than 30 hours per week and more than 1560 hours per year are 
classified as full-time.  Those working more than 100 hours per year but less than 25 hours per 
week are classified as part-time.  Individuals who fall between full-time and part-time or 
between part-time and retired are classified on the basis of self reports.   
 The utility value of leisure takes on a value of  0  for full-time work and  1  for full 
retirement.  For partial retirement it should take on a value  Lp  between 0.5 and 1.  We assume 
that each individual gets a random draw of  Lp  from the relevant part of the exponential 
distribution   k e L pδ .    k is a constant necessary to normalize the distribution to integrate to 
unity between 0.5 and 1.  In order to reflect that partial retirement becomes relatively more 
common at older ages, we allow this distribution to shift as the individual ages by specifying that  
δ  =  δo + δa Age.  Thus the entire distribution of the preferences for partial retirement increases 
over time, although everyone maintains their relative position in the distribution. 
 These preferences allow for three types of heterogeneity.  The time preference parameter  
ρ  is treated as a fixed effect whose value makes the wealth implied by the model consistent with 
the observable wealth in 1992 for each individual.  The other two types of heterogeneity are  ε,  
the general preference for leisure, and  Lp,  the relative attractiveness of partial retirement.  They 
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are treated as random unobserved effects within the model, coming from distributions 
characterized by  σε,   δo  and  δa.  
 This utility function is maximized subject to the constraint 
At  =  (1 + r) At-1  +  Wt (1 - Lt)  +  Et  +  Bt  -  Ct . 
In this equation,  At  is the level of assets at time  t,  and  r  is the real interest rate.  The next term  
Wt (1 - Lt) is earnings, with the wage rate being either the full-time wage or the partial retirement 
real wage rate depending on the choice of  Lt.   Et  is the earnings of the spouse, including any 
pension benefits.   Bt  is the sum of the individual’s own pension benefits and family Social 
Security benefits, both of which may be influenced by the individual’s previous and current work 
decisions.   Ct  is consumption at time  t.   The Social Security benefits are determined by 
applying the current benefit formula to the individual’s own earnings history, augmenting 
earnings records available through 1991 by self reported earnings and information on Social 
Security coverage reported in the survey instrument.  Note that the pension and Social Security 
amounts are actual benefits, not accruals.  This means that Social Security and pension wealth 
are not explicitly calculated but rather are implicitly determined by the fact that the benefits enter 
the asset constraint in future periods. 
Among other factors, we specify the budget constraint to include minimum hours 
constraints requiring full time work or none at all on long term jobs and lower wage offers in 
partial retirement jobs.  Also included are nonlinear benefit accrual profiles in defined benefit 
pension plans, reflecting incentives to accept early retirement and other features of DB plans, and 
the nonlinearities created by various provisions affecting the traditional Social Security benefit. 
Estimation is based on the general method of simulated moments.  We base estimates on 
random draws of parameters, and then simulate the model 10,000 times. 
B. Data Source:  
The analysis is based on data from the first six waves of the Health and Retirement 
Study, collected biannually from 1992 to 2002, including restricted Social Security and pension 
data collected in the initial year of the survey.  Simulations include married men only.  The 
simulations use a real interest rate of 4.31 percent per year as the assumed return on investments 
in personal accounts.  This is the average compounded rate from 1926-2002 of an asset basket of 
50 percent large cap stocks, 5 percent long-term bonds (treasury bonds) and 45 percent treasury 
notes, as measured by Ibbotson Associates.   
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C. Parameter Estimates 
Table 1 reports parameter estimates.  Appendix Table 1 indicates reasons for deletions of 
observations from the sample.  There are 46 moments in the estimation, leaving 38 degrees of 
freedom.  The cutoff points of the chi-squared distribution are 53.15 for 5 percent, so the model 
is not rejected at the 5% significance level.  The coefficients are of similar magnitudes to those in 
our earlier estimates.  Everything except the vintage coefficient is significant.  A key to 
understanding these results is in the time preference rates.  These rates are heterogeneous, with 
45 percent of the population exhibiting time preference rates above 5 percent, and one third 
exhibiting time preference rates of 20 percent or greater.1 
Table 2 reports observed retirement outcomes, and simulated retirement outcomes under 
the current program, with each included individual having the work history actually experienced, 
and reflected in own Social Security earnings record and reported job history.  Comparing these 
two tables, the spike in retirements from full time work at age 62 is approximately the right 
height, although the spike at age 65 is 1 to 3 percentage points too low.  Comparing the flow into 
full retirement, the spikes at both 62 and 65 are a couple of points too low.2   
 III. Policy Simulations. 
 For the policy simulations, we use current law projections, meaning that the population is 
assumed to have been covered over their full lifetimes by the final set of Social Security rules 
now on the books.  These rules include a normal retirement age of 67, a delayed retirement credit 
of 8 percent, and a payroll tax contribution of 10.6% of wages. 
                                                 
1 Distribution of Time Preference Rates 
0-.05 .05-.1 .1-.15 .15-.2 .2-.25 .25-.3 .3-.35 .35-.4 .4-.45 .45-.5 .5-.55 
474 759 170 59 29 22 12 10 4 8 4 
.55-.6 .6-.65 .65-.7 .7-.75 .75-.8 .8-.85 .85-.9 .9-.95 .95-1 >1  
2 1 4 2 1 1 2 1 2 664  
 
 
2 To match the flow of retirements at 65 may require an additional explanation.  The availability of 
Medicare at age 65 reduces the value of employer provided health insurance after that age.  At 65, there essentially 
is a reduction in the wage of an employed person.  It is important to recognize that the missing influence of health 
insurance does not reflect the effect of health insurance coverage per se.  Those who are sufficiently well informed 
could obtain Cobra coverage at age 63.5 that would last until they became eligible for Medicare.  So if the absence 
of coverage were the key determinant of retirement, instead of the net wage, and if workers were sufficiently well 
informed about COBRA, there would be a secondary spike in retirement at age 63.5, rather than at age 65.  We have 
investigated the role of employer provided retiree health insurance and found that role to be minor.  This finding has 




 The policies are simulated by altering the budget constraint described above to build a 
baseline partial, voluntary personal account system, and then to simulate the effects of changing 
various features of the system.  Under each policy alternative, the individual is simulated to 
maximize lifetime utility.  The incentives created by each alternative proposal generate 
behavioral responses.  Given the resulting earnings histories and the choice to participate in a 
personal account, there is a string of tax contributions to the conventional system and to the 
personal accounts.  Payments from the account depend on the extent to which annuitization is 
required or lump sum payments are permitted, and the behavior governing the claiming of the 
lump sum and the annuity from the personal account.  The course of the conventional benefits 
depends both on the offset rule adopted for reducing conventional benefits when a person 
chooses to participate in a personal account, and again on claiming behavior. 
 Alternative policies will create different substitution and wealth effects.  Under the 
current system, a person who has been working 35 years enjoys a gain in benefits from another 
year of work that depends on the relation of earnings in the marginal year to the lowest indexed 
earnings used in computing Average Indexed Monthly Earnings among all previous years of 
work, and on earnings in other years.  But if the interest rate on the personal account exceeds the 
discount rate used to reduce (offset) conventional benefits, a personal account allows some of the 
taxes to be used to raise future benefits.  Any enhanced substitution effect created here will 
encourage delayed retirement.  As long as benefits are higher with the personal account than 
without it, there also will be a wealth effect; but that will encourage earlier retirement.   
Because individuals differ importantly in their time preference, some individuals will 
value lump sum benefits over an actuarially fair annuity (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005a).  In 
the initial specification of the model, lump sum benefits have only an indirect effect on 
retirement.  When a lump sum benefit is claimed, that reduces the marginal utility of 
consumption around the time of claiming, especially for those with a high time preference rate 
whose consumption is constrained by a lack of liquid wealth.  This reduces the value of 
continued work and encourages retirement.  Those with high time preference rates will claim 
their lump sum immediately because they will value immediate cash over future benefits that are 
increased on an actuarially fair basis using an interest rate that is well below the time preference 
rate of the individual.  But this claiming behavior will not affect retirement as long as the person 
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is free to claim the lump sum and the earnings test at age 62 does not affect the lump sum 
benefit.   
Some initial caveats should be mentioned.  There is no agreement about how best to 
balance the finances of the Social Security system.  Depending on how one weighs the resulting 
distribution, one may favor reducing benefits or increasing taxes. Without any clear guidance on 
how the finances of the system will be balanced, we focus on first round behavioral responses to 
personal accounts – but do not include benefit or tax changes that would balance the system.  We 
do not analyze the additional effects of introducing balance into the finances of the Social 
Security system3  Because we are focusing on first round behavioral responses, we do not require 
the different policy changes we consider to have the same financial consequences for Social 
Security.  That is, to understand the effects of various features on retirement and other outcomes, 
we relax one feature at a time, but do not then change the overall benefit in such a way as to be 
comparing programs with identical deficits.  The second major caveat pertains to the absence of 
adjustments for risk.  The additional benefits resulting from the higher return on personal 
accounts are not risk adjusted.  We use a long run historical return for a mixed stock and bond 
portfolio that is meant to be reasonably conservative, but we do not assume here that when 
choosing whether to participate in personal accounts, participants treat any additional returns to 
stocks over bonds as due solely to risk.  It is important to note that there is some balance in our 
assumptions.  Although there is no risk adjustment for the returns to the personal accounts, we 
also do not discount benefits under the conventional formula to reflect perceived political risk.  
Only one type of risk is explicitly taken into account.  Respondents do value the insurance 
provided by the annuity. 
A. Structure of Baseline Personal Accounts 
 We begin by specifying a baseline personal account, and then explore the effects of 
changing some of its key characteristics.  The baseline personal accounts are presumed to work 
the following way.  At the time the individual registers for benefits, the PIA is reduced to take 
                                                 
3In this paper we assume the future course of benefits is determined by current law, so that behavioral 
responses examined here are due only to the introduction of particular provisions of personal accounts.  The 
proposals by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security would reduce benefits from those called for 
under current law.  One effect is that the Commission’s proposal would increase labor supply (Gustman and 




into account the contributions to the personal accounts.4  The resulting amount is the modified 
PIA.  The personal account is divided into two parts.  One part is required to be annuitized into a 
real annuity at the real interest rate and brings the total of the PIA plus the required annuity up to 
a minimal level.  The other part is allowed either to be taken as a lump sum or annuitized, as the 
individual prefers.  Further details of the process are contained in the following paragraphs. 
 The baseline accounts are financed with a 4 percentage point payroll tax rate taken from 
current payroll taxes.  It is assumed that the accounts are voluntary.  Accordingly, total utility is 
calculated both with and without the personal accounts, and the individual is presumed to choose 
whichever yields the most utility.  This is an either / or decision; either the individual eschews 
personal accounts completely or invests in them to the permissible amount.  We do not examine 
the case where the contribution decisions can differ year to year.  Nor do we examine cases 
where the wife’s participation decision is different from the husband; if the husband chooses 
personal accounts, the wife does as well. 
In the baseline package, there is a minimum required annuity.  The sum of the traditional 
benefit (PIA) plus required annuities from the personal accounts for the two spouses must reach 
the family poverty level.  After that the beneficiary is free to take the payment as a lump sum, 
beginning at age 62.5 At the time of the individual’s application, the sum of the individual’s PIA 
plus the spouse’s then current PIA is subtracted from the family poverty level.  The difference is 
what the two required annuities must cover.  The required annuity for the individual is the total 
required annuity times the ratio of the individual’s PIA to the sum of the two PIA’s. 
There are other assumptions underlying the specification of the basic package of personal 
accounts.  The earnings test is assumed to apply proportionately to the two benefits.  That is, the 
                                                 
4 We assume that benefits in the traditional account are reduced via a prorata method.  The pro-rata method 
uses two hypothetical accounts.  The first accumulates cumulatively the contributions to the private accounts at the 
offset rate of 2.5 percent real, which is the interest rate specified in the President’s Commission’s model 3.  The 
second accumulates cumulatively the contributions to the traditional system, also at 2.5 percent real.  Benefits are 
reduced by the percentage of the sum of the cumulative accounts that is due to the contributions to the private 
accounts.  In the current law projection case, with partial accounts this is 4.0 / 10.6 = 37.7%, which is the amount by 
which traditional benefits are reduced.  This applies to the individual’s own benefits and the spouse’s spouse and 
survivor benefits which are due to the individual’s earnings. 
5 We also consider the effects of requiring the sum of the adjusted traditional PIA plus the required 
annuities to reach the single person poverty level; or the sum of the adjusted traditional PIA plus the required 
annuities to reach the unadjusted traditional PIA level (which is the amount that would be calculated from the 




test is applied to the sum of the traditional benefits plus the required annuities to calculate the 
percent of benefits that are lost.6   
 Any sum accumulated in the personal accounts above the required level of annuitization 
is presumed to be available as a lump sum payment at age 62.7 
 B. Participation in Personal Accounts  
 Simulations include a number of outcomes – retirement, the percent of individuals 
choosing personal accounts vs. traditional benefits only, the percent choosing annuities vs. lump 
sums for the part of the personal accounts above what is required to be annuitized, annual 
benefits broken out between benefits from traditional Social Security and benefits from the 
personal accounts, and the total values of benefits and taxes.  Each simulation is done twice, one 
in which personal accounts are available and one in which they are not.  The one with the highest 
lifetime total utility is presumed to be chosen.  Since there is no uncertainty regarding the 
returns, almost all of the middle and high income households choose personal accounts, and most 
of the low income households do as well, especially those who retire at younger ages.  
 Participation in these personal accounts is very high.  This is not a behavioral outcome, 
but is the result of the construction of the model.  We have assumed away uncertainty in the 
returns to the account.  When we tabulate the proportion who choose personal accounts, since 
there is no stock market investment risk in this model, most people choose to participate.  Only 
                                                 
6 It is difficult to conceive of a system that would apply the earnings test to the lump sums, since the lump 
sums are almost by definition amounts that are above the amounts required to achieve the desired level of annual 
benefits.  Similarly, the fate of any new contributions to the personal accounts depends on the status of the accounts. 
If the required annuities do not exhaust the accounts, then the contributions would be available, plus 
interest, in the next year.  If, however, the accounts are insufficient to bring the total annuities up to the required 
levels, then any new contributions would go to purchase additional annuities to narrow the shortfall.  For instance, 
suppose that traditional benefits are $8,000 and the required annuities from the personal accounts are $4000.  If the 
earnings test limit is $6,000 with a $1 reduction for every $2 in earnings above that amount, and if earnings are 
$20,000, then $7,000 [ = 0.5 * (20,000  –  6,000)] in benefits are lost.  Two thirds of this ($4,667) are lost from the 
traditional benefits and one third ($2,333) is lost from the required annuities from the personal accounts, since the 
unreduced traditional benefits are two-thirds [ = 8,000 / (8,000 + 4,000)] of total unreduced benefits.  The lost 
traditional benefits increase later traditional benefits in the usual fashion.  For the benefits that are lost from the 
required annuity, the lost benefits are invested at the real rate of return, and the following year the amount is 
annuitized and added to the previous required annuity. 
 
7 We also analyzed whether the required and optional annuities purchased from the personal accounts are to 
be single life or joint and two-thirds annuities.  The presumption is that the eventual regulations would probably 
require joint annuities, but this investigates whether there is any substantial change in behavior as a result.  When 
single annuities are permitted, there is little change in retirement.  But total benefits are higher under single 
annuities.  A disproportionate amount of these benefits are taken at age 62, so that benefits received in one’s late 




about 2 percent of all husbands from two-earner households choose not to participate, and among 
the bottom third of earners, 5 percent choose not to participate.  When the individual is allowed 
to fully withdraw benefits in the form of a lump sum, participation in personal accounts rises to 
above 99 percent, with 98 percent of the low earners choosing to participate. 
 C. Retirement Outcomes 
 Table 3 presents retirement outcomes at age 62 under alternative specifications of 
systems of personal accounts.  The first three columns report the cumulative levels of the 
fractions of married men who are not retired, partially retired and fully retired.  The last column 
reports the percent retiring from full time work at age 62.   
For purposes of comparison, line 1 of Table 3, and subsequent tables, reports retirement 
outcomes assuming provisions of current law were fully implemented for the entire work lives of 
the sample of married HRS respondents.  By age 62, almost 44 percent of the population of 
married men is projected to be fully retired, with almost 42 percent reporting themselves as not 
retired.  At age 62, column 4 indicates that 15.6 percent of married men are retiring from full 
time work.   
 Line 2 indicates retirement under the baseline reform package of personal accounts.  As 
seen by comparing lines 1 and 2 of Table 3, the base package of personal accounts substantially 
increases retirements by age 62, raising the percent fully retired from 43.8 percent to 57.6 
percent, while reducing the fraction not retired by 9.1 percentage points, and reducing the 
fraction partially retired by 4.7 percentage points.8   
There are a number of major forces operating to influence retirement under the baseline 
system of personal accounts.  First, there are the conventional substitution and income effects.  
Given the higher return to investment, the system of personal accounts raises total benefits in 
retirement, creating an income effect encouraging earlier retirement.  On the other hand, there is 
                                                 
8 There is a secondary spike at age 70, but that is an artifact of the simulations, which assume that all 
individuals retired at that age. 
Although the returns on personal accounts can average out over time, there is a problem when the accounts 
are annuitized.  If the annuities are variable annuities, similar to the annuities TIAA-CREF offers, the value of the 
benefits will fluctuate year to year, sometimes by substantial amounts, and this runs counter to having a reliable 
income stream during retirement.  If the annuities are fixed in real terms, then it may make a great deal of difference 
when the annuitization takes place.  An individual who annuitized in 2000, for instance, would have twice the 
annuity as another individual with similar lifetime earnings and contributions who annuitized in 2003.  The unequal 
treatment of roughly equal individuals would make the differences involved in the “notch generation” debate small 




a greater reward to continued work for higher income people who otherwise would be in the 15 
percent PIA bracket.  For those with high time preference -- especially those in the population 
with a time preference rate well above the interest rate who accrue little saving, and will value a 
lump sum benefit over an annuity that is of equal present value when evaluated at the market 
interest rate -- allowing lump sum payouts may create a stronger incentive to retire early.  When 
a lump sum is claimed by those with little other saving, it is likely to be consumed over the next 
few years, driving down the marginal utility of income from work.  As a result, many of those 
with a high rate of time preference will leave work at age 62.  Thus column 4 of Table 3 shows 
that the fraction leaving full time work increases from 15.6 percent under the current system to 
21.6 percent under the basic voluntary system.   
Row 3 of Table 3 reports retirement outcomes under a system where the conventional 
Social Security payroll tax may be entirely converted to a personal account.  Comparing lines 2 
and 3 thus allows comparison of a system with partial conversion to personal accounts, that is a 
system based on 4 percentage points of a payroll tax, with a system where the full 10.6 percent 
payroll tax may be converted to a personal account.  While the fraction fully retired at age 62 is 
57.6% under a system where the account may include up to 4 percentage points of the payroll 
tax, it is 63.2% where the full payroll tax may be included in the account. The fraction not retired 
would decline from 32.8% under a partial system of personal accounts, to 27.9% if the full 
payroll tax could be included in the personal account, and there would be a .7% difference in the 
fraction partially retired.   
Lines 4 and 5 of Table 3 clarify effects on retirement of allowing lump sum benefits.  The 
simulation in line 4 pertains to a system requiring that all benefits from personal accounts be 
fully annuitized.  The higher return to personal accounts once again creates a wealth effect that 
exceeds the substitution effect, and thus encourages earlier retirement.  The underlying interest 
rate is well below the time preference rates estimated above for an important fraction of the 
population, so these individuals will retire early just as they did when facing the conventional 
benefit structure.  However, they do not receive a lump sum benefit, and thus place a higher 
value on work around age 62 than they would if a lump sum benefit were available.  Requiring 
complete annuitization of benefits from the personal account would reduce the fraction fully 
retired at age 62 down to 48.3 percent.   
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Remember that the availability of lump sum benefits at age 62 is not conditioned on 
whether a person is working.  The earnings test applies only to benefits from the conventional 
system plus benefits from the annuities paid out of the personal account.  The present simulations 
do not provide a mechanism for clawing back any lump sum payments at age 62 should the 
individual continue working in a job offering long term employment.   
Comparing rows 1, 2 and 4 helps us to decompose the decrease in retirement when 
transitioning from the current system to the baseline system of partial personal accounts.  This 
comparison suggests that 9.3 percentage points of the increase in the fraction fully retired 
(column 3, row 2 minus row 4) results from the depressing effect of the lump sum payment at 
age 62 on the marginal utility of work, and 4.5 percentage points of the increase in retirements 
(row 4 minus row 1) is due to the income effect from receiving higher retirement benefits, net of 
substitution effect resulting from a higher reward to work at later ages.  Analogously, the fraction 
retiring at age 62 is 18.9 percent when full annuitization is required, up from 15.6 percent under 
the current system, but would rise to 21.6 percent under the basic, voluntary partial personal 
account plan.  There is a further effect from introducing personal accounts.  Specifically, a 4.7 
percentage point reduction in the fraction partially retired appears to be almost entirely due to the 
effects of making lump sum payments available at age 62, with their depressing effects on the 
marginal utility of consumption for those with high discount rates, rather than to the wealth 
effect of the higher returns to personal accounts.  When the package of personal accounts is 
introduced, partial retirement falls from 14.3 percent to 9.6 percent.  Accordingly, introducing 
personal accounts reduces work effort by reducing both full time work and partial retirement.9  
However, 15 percent of the population chooses partial retirement when personal accounts are 
introduced, but lump sum benefits are not available, so the income effect from personal accounts 
explains almost none of the decline in partial retirement.   
Alternatively, as seen in Row 5 of Table 3, if complete lump sum withdrawals were 
permitted, that is, even those with below poverty incomes were not forced to annuitize a 
minimum benefit, full retirement would rise to 60.3 percent, with only 31.2 percent not retired at 
age 62.   
                                                 
9 The increase in the lifetime value of personal account benefits when the personal account must be fully 
annuitized is a reflection of the effect of additional work on earnings, and thus on benefits.    
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We also conducted a number of other simulations.  We found that the choice of offset 
method used to reduce traditional benefits has little effect on retirement outcomes. 10  Further 
simulations show the larger the required annuitization, and thus the smaller the lump sum 
benefits that can be claimed, the lower the retirement rate as a result of adopting personal 
accounts.  Lastly, exempting the annuities from personal accounts from the earnings test will 
slightly increase work effort. 
 D. Retirement Saving Under Alternative Plans 
 In the context of a life cycle model of saving behavior, our assumption of a 4.31% real 
return to these accounts means that personal accounts will reduce the incentive to save outside of 
Social Security.11  Simulated differences in wealth accumulated by age (unadjusted for mortality 
and undiscounted) are shown in Table 4 for the various programs discussed above.  Excluding 
pensions and Social Security, the highest levels of wealth are accumulated under the current 
system, averaging about $140,000 at age 61.  Wealth accumulated by age 61 is almost $30,000 
lower under a system of partial personal accounts, and is $56,000 lower when the current system 
is fully converted to personal accounts.  Part of the gap in saving is made up by lump sum 
payments which are realized at age 62, the rest (and more) by higher payments at later ages.  
Even when lump sum benefits are not permitted, as in line 4 of Table 4, the personal account 
system reduces saving.   
E. The Choice Between Lump Sum Payments and Annuitized Benefits 
                                                 
10Using an alternative offset method similar to that used by the President’s Commission did not have major 
effects on the findings.  In simulations with offsets, it was assumed that the personal accounts were mandatory.  
With certain returns in the personal accounts that were higher than the offset interest rate, the model would show 
that everyone would prefer the personal accounts were they voluntary.  Here the contributions to the personal 
accounts are cumulated at the offset rate of 2.5 percent real.  The resulting amount is then discounted to the normal 
retirement age at 2.5 percent real and transformed into a single annuity at the same interest rate.  This puts the offset 
computations on a comparable basis with the PIA, which is the traditional benefit available at normal retirement.  
Traditional benefits are then reduced by the ratio of this annuity to the PIA.  The reduction applies to the 
individual’s own benefit only, and not to any spouse or survivor benefits which depend on the individual’s earnings 
record, since the offset account is annuitized with a single life annuity.  A joint annuity would be very difficult to 
compute, since the spouse benefits depend on the relation of half of the individual’s PIA to the spouse’s PIA, and 
the applicable spouse’s PIA may well not have been determined at the time the individual applies for benefits. For 
further discussion of alternative offset methods, see Gustman and Steinmeier (2005c).  There we show that the offset 
method adopted by the President’s Commission essentially taxes away the principal created in the private account 
from payroll tax deposits made in the name of the covered individual.  That reduces the insurance the account would 
otherwise provide against unforeseen changes in Social Security benefits that might be adopted in the future. 
11 Projecting the saving response to personal accounts is a dicey proposition.  Given the close positive 
relation between pensions and other saving, Cagan (1965) and Katona (1965) postulate that pensions may make 




 As seen in Table 5, simulations for the basic package of personal accounts suggests that 
46.2 percent will choose a lump sum payment, 48.5 percent will choose a voluntary annuity, and 
5.4 percent will not have sufficient annuitized benefits to allow them to take a lump sum.  That 
is, they will not have an annuity equal to the family poverty level.  The earlier one retires the 
greater the proportion choosing to accept a lump sum payment from their personal accounts 
rather than annuitizing funds available for a voluntary annuity.  For example, as seen in Table 5, 
for the base package of personal accounts, almost two thirds of those retiring in their early fifties 
choose to take a lump sum settlement when they reach age 62, while 40 to 47 percent of those 
retiring between 58 and 62 choose a lump sum settlement.  Seventy percent of those retiring at 
exactly 62 choose a lump sum settlement.  Among those retiring from age 63 on, only about a 
fifth will choose a lump sum settlement over annuitized benefits. 
 Table B in the Appendix shows how the proportion choosing lump sum vs. voluntary 
annuities out of the discretionary funds in the personal accounts varies among the different plans.  
Discretionary funds are those in excess of any annuity that is required to ensure that retirement 
income meets the minimum level specified in the plan.  For most variations of the personal 
account plans, about half of participants choose to take their benefits from the personal account 
as a lump sum.  We will see below that the heterogeneity in the decision to accept a lump sum 
benefit will affect the distribution of retirement income at different ages.    
 F. Benefits by Age 
 Despite having only modest effects on retirement, the features of these alternative 
systems have major effects on retirement incomes of the covered populations.  Where 
annuitization is not mandatory, as noted in Table 5, many will choose to take lump sum 
payments at age 62.  Thus we see in Table 6A in those programs where lump sum payments are 
permitted, i.e., in rows 2, 3 and 5, the average benefit taken at age 62 (in 1992 dollars) is equal in 
dollar amount to two to four times the average yearly annuitized benefit paid at age 70.   
 In contrast, as seen in row 4 of Table 6A, in plans for personal accounts where full 
annuitization is required, the average benefit taken at age 62 is much lower than the average 
benefit at age 70, as many put off benefit claiming until a later age.  Moreover, within those 
plans allowing a lump sum payment, the lower the required annuity, and the higher the permitted 
lump sum, the smaller the yearly benefit at older ages compared to the benefit at age 62.   
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 One issue is how widows will fare if lump sum benefits are claimed at age 62, either by 
the family when both spouses are alive, or by the widow.  Table 6B shows that spouses on 
average will be just as well off under the baseline system of partial privatization as under the 
current program, assuming the 4.31% real return to the personal account portfolio.  Scanning 
down the benefits by program for 85 year olds, widow’s benefits will be higher than under the 
current program only if there is complete conversion of the current system to personal accounts, 
or if under a plan with partial personal accounts, annuitization is mandatory. 
 G. Comparing Benefits and Taxes 
Total taxes and benefits over the lifetime are shown in Table 7, where taxes and benefits 
are shown in 1992 dollars, adjusted for mortality, but not discounted.  Total taxes paid decline by 
1.2 percent under the baseline personal account program, compared to the current law 
projections for traditional Social Security benefits.  In addition to the decline in total taxes paid, 
there is a much larger decline in taxes paid into the trust fund as taxes are diverted to personal 
accounts.  For the baseline personal account program, the maximum decline in taxes paid into 
the trust fund due to diversion of taxes from conventional benefits to personal accounts is 37.7 
percent (4/10.6).12   
Table 7 also shows the decline in lifetime benefits from $328,955 to $199,878, or almost 
40 percent.  Thus the decline in benefits and taxes from adoption of personal accounts are 
roughly of the same proportion.  However, because taxes are reduced years before benefits are 
reduced, the movement to personal accounts does present a solvency problem. Given the 
assumption of a real return to the personal account portfolio of 4.31 percent per year, and the 
heavy pattern of participation in these accounts, the increase in total benefits, i.e. the sum of 
benefits from the traditional system and from personal accounts, is substantial, rising from 
$328,955 to $410,434.13  
H. Implications of Having An Effective Earnings Test on Lump Sum Benefits 
There are alternative policies that might link the availability of lump sum benefits to 
continued work.  For example, suppose that to prevent a wave of cash outs at age 62, the lump 
sum were paid out in four quarterly payments that required the individual be retired.  Or a 
                                                 
12The actual decline in taxes is slightly less than 37.7 percent since 5 percent of covered workers will 
choose not to accept the personal account, and these will mainly come from the ranks of low income workers. 
13 Again, this calculation does not take into account any risk premium either for stock market investment, 
or the political risk to current Social Security promises. 
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waiting period were instituted, where the person had to be out of the labor market for a specified 
time before the lump sum would be payable.  Either of these strategies would establish a link 
between work and availability of the lump sum benefit that may encourage earlier retirement 
than if the lump sum payment were not available.  Most importantly, either strategy would 
require a person who wanted the lump sum payout to sever the connection with a long term 
employer. 
IV. Implications and Conclusions 
 These simulations explore a number of behavioral responses to systems of personal 
accounts, focusing on those responses that are most relevant to policy design.  Particular features 
of personal accounts will affect retirement behavior, saving, participation in personal accounts, 
and the choice of whether to take benefits as a lump sum or an annuity.  These choices in turn 
will affect the flow of benefits and taxes, and ultimately the adequacy of benefits. 
Among our findings: Under a system of partial personal accounts, total retirement 
benefits would increase by about a quarter, while the fraction of 62 year olds at full time work 
would decline by about 22 percent compared to the current system.  If the current system were 
replaced completely by personal accounts, total retirement benefits would increase by about 75 
percent and the fraction at full time work would decline by about a third.  If all benefits from 
personal accounts could be taken as a lump sum, the fraction not retired at age 62 would fall by 
about 5 percentage points compared to a system where there is mandatory annuitization of 
benefits.  When annuitization is voluntary, there will be substantial diversion of benefits to age 
62.  When annuitization is mandatory, benefits received in one’s 70s and 80s may be increased 
by 20 percent or more. 
 Retirement responses are relatively modest, but the predicted increase in retirements from 
adopting partial personal accounts should nevertheless be of concern to policy makers.  Increased 
retirements will further reduce the labor supply of older workers beyond the decline caused by 
the retirement of the baby boom.   
 Our analysis simplifies behavior on a number of dimensions.  Decision makers are 
imperfectly informed (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004b).  Their behavior may be influenced by 
defaults or other factors unrelated to returns (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2003, 2004).  
And once again, there is no uncertainty built into the model.  Depending on whether a person 
discounts traditional Social Security benefits or expected stock returns more heavily, one might 
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have a greater or lesser tendency to participate in the personal accounts than are suggested by our 
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α Consumption parameter -0.16 2.60 
 Parameters in β   
β0    Constant -10.01 246.52 
βa    Coefficient of Agea 0.084 4.78 
βh    Coefficient of Healthd 4.71 4.54 
βc    Coefficient of Cohortb,d (Year of Birth) 0.03 0.28 
 Parameters in δ   
δ0    Constant -3.75 5.93 
δa    Coefficient of Agec 0.56 2.66 
σε Standard Deviation of εd 5.11 6.06 
   
 q value 52.11 
 Number of observations 2231 
    
Several variables are differenced from their approximate means in the sample in order to 
facilitate estimation.  They are: 
   a  The actual variable is age - 62. 
   b  The actual variable is cohort - 1936. 
   c  The actual variable is age - 65. 





Table 2: Observed and Projected Retirement Percentages 
Observed Retirement Percentages Projected Retirement Percentages 










50 4.1 3.3 4.1 3.3 243 4.5 3.1 4.5 3.1
51 0.9 0 5 3.3 361 1.4 0.9 5.9 4.1
52 2.7 2.2 7.6 5.5 510 1.7 1.2 7.6 5.3
53 2 1.1 9.7 6.6 621 1.5 1.1 9.1 6.4
54 2.1 1.3 11.8 7.9 712 1.9 1.4 11 7.8
55 3.1 2.7 14.9 10.6 801 3.2 2.4 14.2 10.2
56 1.9 2.1 16.8 12.7 907 3.2 2.4 17.4 12.6
57 4 3.2 20.8 15.9 990 3.5 2.8 20.9 15.4
58 3 2.1 23.8 18 1064 4.2 3.4 25.1 18.8
59 3.6 2.1 27.4 20.1 1132 4.5 3.6 29.6 22.4
60 6 6.4 33.4 26.4 1121 6.5 5.3 36.1 27.6
61 6.3 5.5 39.7 31.9 1043 5.4 4.3 41.4 32
62 15.1 12.5 54.8 44.4 986 14.8 10.3 56.2 42.2
63 5.6 3.4 60.4 47.9 909 6.2 4.9 62.4 47.1
64 6.7 6.7 67.1 54.6 843 5.9 4.9 68.2 52
65 9.1 6.7 76.2 61.3 744 6 5.3 74.2 57.3
66 4.5 3.9 80.7 65.2 658 4.5 4.1 78.7 61.3
67 2.8 2.9 83.5 68.1 565 4.2 4 82.9 65.3
68 3.1 3.3 86.7 71.4 472 3.7 3.3 86.6 68.6
69 1.7 4.6 88.4 76 379 3 2.6 89.7 71.3






Table 3: Retirement Outcomes Under Alternative Systems of Personal Accounts 
    











Program Features (variation from base package)     
1. Current law projections of traditional Social Security 41.9 14.3 43.8 15.6
Revised Systems with Personal Accounts 
2. Base package of personal accounts 32.8 9.6 57.6 21.6
3. Total conversion to personal accounts 27.9 8.9 63.2 23.3
4. Full annuitization required 36.7 15 48.3 18.9






Table 4: Wealth by Age Conditional on Both Spouses Living (in 1992 dollars, unadjusted for mortality) 
61 62 70 75 80 85 90
Program Features (variation from base package)    
1. Current law Social Security 140028 148305 155113 122812 88634 56404 29148
2. Base package of personal accounts 111601 138839 123891 95909 67239 41430 20545
3. Total conversion to personal accounts 83907 132864 115582 88687 61425 37339 18108
4. Full annuitization required 113228 120313 111607 87957 62797 39205 19528
5. Annuitization optional, full lump sum permitted 111600 140271 124077 96008 67277 41448 20551
 
Base package = Current law traditional benefits, voluntary, partial (4% of contribution) accounts, prorated traditional benefits, 






              Table 5: Percent Choosing Voluntary Annuities Under Base Package of Personal Accounts 
    
Age Retired From FT 
Work No Funds Available Lump Sum Voluntary Annuity
    
50 9 60.9 30.1
51 3.9 64.9 31.2
52 3.9 64.2 31.9
53 1.1 63.3 35.6
54 1.5 57.3 41.2
55 1.6 56.5 41.8
56 3 49.5 47.5
57 1.6 50.4 48.1
58 2.7 45.5 51.8
59 3 46.7 50.2
60 3.2 40.1 56.7
61 3.8 46.4 49.8
62 7.2 69.7 23.1
63 8.3 20.5 71.1
64 8.9 18.8 72.3
65 6.5 20.6 72.8
66 5.5 19.9 74.6
67 3 20.6 76.4
68 4.6 22 73.4
69 6.2 22.7 71.1
70 8.8 37 54.2
    




Table 6A: Traditional Social Security Benefits Plus Benefit From Personal Accounts by Age of Receipt,  
Assuming Husband and Wife are Alive 
(Unadjusted for mortality, in 1992 dollars) 
62 70 75 80 85
Program Features (variation from base package)      
1. Current law projections of traditional Social Security 3679 16139 16906 17059 17059
2. Base package of personal accounts 48147 18665 17444 17347 17407
3. Total conversion to personal accounts 92830 21791 21432 21113 21192
4. Full annuitization required 7044 20978 21898 22078 22128
5. Annuitization optional, full lump sum withdrawal permitted 52012 18386 17110 16999 17061
 
Base package = Current law traditional benefits, voluntary, partial (4% of contribution) accounts, prorated traditional benefits, 




Table 6B: Traditional Social Security Benefits Plus Benefit From Personal Accounts by Age of Receipt,  
Assuming Wife Only Is Alive 
(Unadjusted for mortality, in 1992 dollars) 
62 70 75 80 85
Program Features (variation from base package)      
1. Current law projections of traditional Social Security 1061 9546 10780 10999 11061
2. Base package of personal accounts 45127 12400 11364 11296 11367
3. Total conversion to personal accounts 89992 15091 14469 14098 14166
4. Full annuitization required 3861 13304 14244 14413 14461
5. Annuitization optional, full lump sum withdrawal permitted 49001 12237 11149 11067 11140
 
Base package = Current law traditional benefits, voluntary, partial (4% of contribution) accounts, prorated traditional benefits, 






Table 7: Taxes and Expected Family Benefits from Social Security and Personal Accounts  
(In 1992 dollars, adjusted for mortality, but not discounted) 












Program Features (variation from base package)     
1. Current law projections of traditional Social Security 171428 328955 0 328955
2. Base package of personal accounts 169304 199878 210556 410434
3. Total conversion to personal accounts 167331 0 574346 577009
4. Full annuitization required 169886 199540 251026 450566
5. Annuitization optional, full lump sum withdrawal permitted 169151 199330 207820 407150
 
Base package = Current law traditional benefits, voluntary, partial (4% of contribution) accounts, prorated traditional benefits, 





Appendix Table 1: Reasons for Deletions of Observations 
 
                                                 Obs       Obs 
                                               Dropped     Left 
Total sample individuals                                  12652 
Not specified gender                            6785       5867 
Not specified marital status                    1578       4289 
Spouse not interviewed if married                133       4156 
Not a career worker                              497       3659 
Ambiguity about whether jobs are ss covered       49       3610 
No FT earnings in ss record or self report        36       3574 
No sr earnings, and ss earnings over limit        31       3543 
Relatively large business assets                 291       3252 
No Pension Provider record in last job           865       2387 
FT years unavailable for spouse                  156       2231 
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Additional Tables:  
Table A: Percent Choosing Personal Accounts 
 
   
 Low Income Total 
Program Features (variation from base package)   
1. Current law projections of traditional Social Security 0 0
2. Base package of personal accounts 95.4 98.5
3. Full annuitization required 94.1 97.9
4. Annuitization optional, full lump sum withdrawal permitted 98.4 99.4
5. Total conversion to personal accounts 94.7 98.2
6. Mandatory personal accounts, using offset accounts 100.0 100.0
7. Mandatory personal accounts 100.0 100.0
8. Annuitize to single person poverty level 94.9 98.3
9. Annuitization up to currently scheduled PIA 94.9 98.2
10. Single annuities 95.8 98.6
11. Required personal accounts not subject to earnings test 95.6 98.5





Table B: Percent Choosing Lump Sum vs. Voluntary Annuities  






Program Features (variation from base package)    
1. Current law projections of traditional Social Security 100.0 0 0
Revised Systems with Personal Accounts 
2. Base package of personal accounts 5.4 46.2 48.5
3. Full annuitization required 100.0 0 0
4. Annuitization optional, full lump sum withdrawal permitted 0.6 50.1 49.3
5. Total conversion to personal accounts 4.8 45.9 49.2
6. Mandatory personal accounts, using offset accounts 5.0 50.9 44.1
7. Mandatory personal accounts 4.8 46.5 48.7
8. Annuitize to single person poverty level 7.0 45.6 47.4
9. Annuitization up to currently scheduled PIA 4.8 52.9 42.4
10. Single annuities 4.5 63.1 32.4
11. Required personal accounts not subject to earnings test 5.4 45.9 48.6
    
Base package = Current law traditional benefits, voluntary, partial (4% of contribution) accounts, prorated 
traditional benefits, annuitize to family poverty level, joint and 2/3 annuity, required personal accounts subject 
to earnings test. 
  
 
 
